Endogenous growth requires that non-reproducible factors of production be augmented or eliminated. Attention heretofore has focused almost exclusively on augmentation. In this article we present a theory of endogenous factor elimination. We use a Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors of production, one reproducible and one not. For simplicity and clarity, there is no augmenting progress of any kind, thus excluding the standard engine of growth. By spending resources on R&D, agents learn to change the exponents of the production function. We obtain the economy's balanced growth path and complete transition dynamics. The theory provides an endogenous mechanism for the transition from an initial diminishing returns technology incapable of supporting perpetual growth to one with constant returns to the reproducible factors that does support perpetual growth. As a result, even though the economy initially fails to satisfy the linearity (or singularity) condition necessary for sustained growth, it nonetheless eventually does satisfy it through the kind of technical progress we study. The linearity restriction thus emerges endogenously rather than being imposed as in virtually all other growth models. Also in contrast to virtually all other growth models, the origin is not a steady state, and the economy grows out of it. The theory thus o¤ers a purely endogenous explanation for the transition from a primitive economy seemingly doomed to stagnation to one that is developed and perpetually growing. The theory makes strong predictions on the relation between factor intensities and income per person, some of them contrary to widely held beliefs, and the data are consistent with those predictions.
Introduction
Perpetual growth of income per capita requires that the marginal products of all reproducible factors of production (e.g., physical capital, human capital) be bounded away from zero. Theoretical investigations achieve this necessary condition by augmenting the non-reproducible factors (e.g., land, unskilled labor, natural resources); empirical investigations naturally follow the lead of the theory. There is, however, another way to satisfy the necessary condition: eliminate the non-reproducible factors from the production function. In this paper, we propose a theory of endogenous factor elimination, examine its implications for economic growth and other issues, and provide evidence of its empirical relevance.
Non-reproducible factors act as a drag on reproducible factors. As the ratio of reproducible to nonreproducible factors rises, the marginal products of the reproducible factors fall until further accumulation is no longer justi…ed. At that point, growth stops. Augmenting the non-reproducible factors o¤sets this drag by e¤ectively increasing their amounts, thereby raising the marginal products of the reproducible factors and permitting their accumulation to continue. Factor-eliminating technical progress delivers growth through a very di¤erent mechanism. As its name implies, it relaxes the constraint on growth by reducing the importance of non-reproducible factors in the production function.
In our theory, maximizing agents decide when it is optimal to reduce the importance of a non-reproducible factor. To keep matters as simple as possible, we use a Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors of production, one reproducible and one not. We also assume, again for simplicity and clarity, that there is no factor-augmenting technical progress of any kind, whether Hicks, Harrod, or Solow neutral, so the standard engine of growth is excluded by construction. What is new is the possibility of changing factor intensities (that is, the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas production function) by devoting resources to R&D. The general equilibrium dynamics have two possible outcomes. One is an economy whose production function asymptotically becomes AK, thus supporting perpetual growth. The other is an economy that comes to rest in a steady state with no growth and a standard production function with …xed factor intensities bounded away from 0 and 1. If the economy has a su¢ ciently high saving rate, it achieves perpetual growth.
The theory has several interesting implications. The theory resolves the linearity critique, initially due to Solow (1994) , expanded by Jones (2005) , and formalized by Growiec (2007) , who proves that all growth models require that some important relation be linear. Precisely which one depends on whether the model is one of exogenous, endogenous, or semi-endogenous growth. The critique implies fragility of existing growth models because the necessary linear relation is an ad hoc assumption with no convincing rationale. With factor-eliminating technical change, the (asymptotic) AK production function is the endogenous limit of an economy not initially AK, so the required linearity emerges endogenously from an economy that initially does not possess it.
The theory also o¤ers a fresh insight on economic development, that is, how the economy leaves a primitive starting point and makes the transition to a developed state. Modern transition theories typically posit that society is endowed from the start with two production functions, one primitive and one advanced, and over time reallocates resources from the former to the latter. For example, Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) assume that society is endowed with knowledge of two such technologies, and moves from the primitive to the advanced technology in response to exogenous population growth. Hansen and Prescott (2002) also posit primitive and advanced production functions (the "Malthus" and "Solow" technologies) with the transition between them driven by exogenous technical progress. Galor and Weil (2000) propose a model of the demographic transition that has only one production technology but that relies on an initial period of costless technical progress to put the economy on a path of self-sustaining endogenous growth. In our theory, by contrast, there is no exogenous population growth, no exogenous technical progress, no costless technical progress, and only one initial technology. Alternative technologies appear endogenously, arising if and only if people use resources to invent them. Furthermore, an economy that starts with no capital and no knowledge of how to use it can learn to use capital and then build it.
Finally, the theory generates testable implications that are supported by the evidence. In particular, it resolves the current controversy concerning the cross-country behavior of factor shares. Gollin (2002) , Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) , Rodríguez and Ortega (2006) , Caselli and Feyrer (2007) , and Zuleta (2007) present con ‡icting evidence, some suggesting that the shares of capital and labor are unrelated to income per person and other suggesting a systematic relationship. Our theory shows that the controversy arises from a failure to distinguish between reproducible and non-reproducible factors. When the proper distinction is maintained, the con ‡ict disappears. The share of total capital is negatively related to output per worker, as previous investigators have found, but the share of reproducible capital is positively related to output per worker. The two results together imply that the share of natural capital is negatively related to output per worker. Similarly, the share of total human factors is negatively related to output per worker but the share of human capital alone is positively related to output per worker.
Background, Intuition, and Related Literature
Consider a generic production function Y = F (K; L), where Y , K and L are output, reproducible inputs (call them "capital") and non-reproducible inputs (call them "labor"), and F satis…es the usual neoclassical assumptions (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, chapter 2, for a list). For simplicity suppose that L is constant. As K grows, the marginal product of capital shrinks to the point where the marginal bene…t of capital accumulation just equals its marginal cost, bringing growth to a halt. 1 The property that guarantees this outcome is the Inada condition lim K!+1 F K (K; L) = 0:
To generate perpetual growth of income per capita, the Solow and Cass models introduce augmentation of labor. The production function has the form F (K; AL), where A is labor-augmenting knowledge that grows at the exogenous rate g. Perpetual growth is feasible because the endowment of e¤ective labor AL grows over time and drives up the marginal product of capital, sustaining incentives for accumulation. Speci…cally, the linear homogeneity of F allows us to write lim K!+1 F K K A ; L and the ratio K=A remains …nite because in steady state K and A grow at the same rate g. This theory is better called a theory with growth than a theory of growth because growth arises from strictly exogenous forces that the theory makes no attempt to explain. The great advance of endogenous growth theory is precisely to endogenize technical progress. For example, in Romer's (1986) path-breaking model of learningby-doing, A is proportional to K, so that we have F (K; KL). Variety expansion and quality ladder models have the same property, augmenting the non-reproducible factor and thus enabling perpetual growth. 2 Elimination of the non-reproducible factors achieves the same end by a di¤erent mechanism. The key insight is a straightforward implication of the reason why non-reproducible factors drag growth to a halt. To see it, write
This …rst equality follows from L'Hopital's rule. It shows that the Inada condition is equivalent to the condition that the average product of capital goes to zero. The second equality implies that the average product of capital goes to zero because labor is essential, that is, because F (1; 0) = 0. It follows that theories of perpetual growth are, in essence, theories of how economic agents overcome scarcity of essential, non-reproducible factors of production: augmentation does it by transforming non-reproducible factors into reproducible ones; elimination does it by dispensing with the non-reproducible factors altogether.
The CES production function provides a concrete example of factor elimination and how it di¤ers from factor augmentation. If we de…ne K and L su¢ ciently broadly to include all factors of production, the Replication Argument implies that the function exhibits constant returns to scale:
; a 2 (0; 1) ; 1
We are interested in how technical change can overcome the drag caused by the presence of the essential but non-reproducible factor L. We therefore restrict attention to 0 so that K and L are essential. The e¢ ciency coe¢ cients B K and B L are the source of factor-augmenting technical change. The factor share parameters a and 1 a are the source of factor-eliminating technical change. Because B K and B L are raised to the power whereas a and 1 a are not, the production function is homogeneous of degree 1 in B K and B L jointly, but is not homogeneous of any degree in a (or in a and 1 a). Therefore, changes in the e¢ ciency and share parameters have di¤erent e¤ects. An increase in either B K or B L raises output so that it is not advantageous to reduce either B K or B L . In contrast, an increase in a raises output only if B K K=B L L < 1 and reduces it if B K K=B L L > 1. Moreover, an increase in either B K or B L lowers the conditional demand for both K and L, and because it does so by di¤erent magnitudes it induces …rms to change the input ratio K=L. That is why factor-augmenting technical change is said to be factor-saving and directed or skill-biased (Kennedy 1964 ). 3 In contrast, an increase in a generally raises the conditional factor demand for K and lowers that for L (always when < 0 and for a not too large when = 0). 4 Accordingly, it is a stronger form of directed technical progress. Indeed, a major result of our analysis is that factor-eliminating technical change allows the economy to achieve perpetual growth precisely because it is so strongly biased toward the reproducible factors that it creates a feedback whereby increases in a induce investment in K which raises the value of further increasing a and so leads to R&D to raise a even more.
The general CES function is cumbersome, especially with endogenous, time-varying values of a, so in what follows we assume = 0 (i.e., the Cobb-Douglas case). Also, for simplicity and focus, we rule out augmentation, setting B K = B L = 1. Thus we work with
Factor-eliminating technical change raises a and so reduces the importance of the non-reproducible factor L. When a reaches 1, L is no longer a drag on growth. 5 Previous research has dwelt almost exclusively on factor augmentation. The only early work studying factor elimination we have found are one contribution by Kamien and Schwartz (1968) and one by Sato and Beckmann (1968) . Kamien and Schwartz (1968) examine the optimal R&D expenditure policy of an atomistic …rm that faces …xed factor prices and that can devote R&D resources to change TFP or the factor exponents. Kamien and Schwartz's results are very limited because they take factor prices as given, una¤ected by the fruits of R&D. They do not analyze general or even partial equilibrium. Sato and Beckmann (1968) did an empirical analysis of fourteen alternative forms of the production function to determine which best …t the data for Germany, Japan, and the United States. They found that the Cobb-Douglas form with time-varying exponents gave good …ts for all three countries and in fact for Japan gave the best …t.
Despite those promising theoretical and empirical contributions, research on factor-eliminating progress lay dormant for nearly forty years until Seater (2005) reopened the topic. He studies a centrally planned economy with Cobb-Douglas production and exogenous technical progress that alters the factor exponents. He discusses several implications for economic growth, the income distribution, and some macroeconometric 3 See Acemoglu (2002) and the references cited therein for a thorough discussion of directed or skill-biased technical change. 4 An appendix with the derivations of the foregoing properties of augmenting and eliminating technical change is available from the authors on request. 5 Constant returns to scale in the Cobb-Douglas do not arise from the fact that the share parameters sum to one in the underlying CES but from the fact that the CES is homogenous of degree 1 in K and L. Indeed, if we write
and take the limit as ! 0, we get Y = AK a K a K +a L L a L a K +a L whose exponents sum to one even though a K and a L may not.
issues, but he does not characterize the economy's growth path. Recently, has extended Seater's analysis in an important way. Like Seater, he restricts attention to a centrally planned economy with Cobb-Douglas production, but his planner decides the division of savings between capital accumulation and adoption of a new technology from an exogenously available set. Under additional assumptions Zuleta is able to characterize the growth path.
In this paper, we study factor-eliminating technical progress in the context of market equilibrium rather than central planning. We also treat technical progress as invention of new technology rather than adoption of a speci…c technology from an exogenous set. Imperfectly competitive …rms invest resources to learn new technologies that increase production by reducing dependency on non-reproducible factors. We obtain a complete characterization of the dynamics and discuss several implications of the theory, some of which we support with readily-available cross-country data.
Before proceeding to our theory, we mention brie ‡y a related strand of the literature. Factor elimination has a super…cial resemblance to the growth-through-factor-substitution that arises if a CES production function has a su¢ ciently high elasticity of substitution (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Chapter 1, 2004) . Boldrin and Levine (2002) , Givon (2006) , and Zeira (1998 Zeira ( , 2006 present elaborations that rely on the same mechanism: agents substitute capital for labor simply because the economy is endowed with a key parameter that makes the substitution worthwhile. One weakness of the CES/substitution theory is that growth is mechanical and simply a matter of chance: if mankind has been given a su¢ ciently high elasticity of substitution, then the technology for producing with less of the non-reproducible factor is available for free and agents do not have to invest scarce resources to develop it. 6 More important yet is that the elasticity of substitution must exceed 1 (i.e., > 0), so that neither factor is essential. (In fact, labor can be set to zero at any time and production continues with capital alone.) Consequently, the CES/substitution theory is not a theory of how the economy overcomes scarcity of essential, non-reproducible factors. Finally, as a practical matter, modern industrial economies do not have elasticities of substitution above the critical level needed to sustain endogenous growth, yet they have been growing for centuries and show no sign of slowing down. 7 
A Theory of Factor Elimination
There are three groups of agents: a representative household, competitive producers of …nal goods, a …xed mass of monopolistic producers of intermediate goods.
Households
Households own a …xed endowment of a non-reproducible factor. We call this factor "labor" but it includes all non-reproducible factors: unskilled labor, land, natural resources. Households also own …rms and receive their pro…ts as dividend income. Finally, as in the Solow model, they supply labor services inelastically in a competitive market and save a …xed fraction of their total income. We thus ignore consumption-saving and labor-leisure choice, greatly simplifying the analysis.
The Final Good Sector
There is one …nal good, Y , produced by competitive …rms according to the technology (1) , where P i is the price of good i. This problem yields the well known demand function
where
is the price index of intermediate goods. Since …nal producers are competitive and earn zero pro…t, we have P X = P Y = 1 and we can drop the index P X from (2) in the remainder of the analysis.
The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate monopolistic …rms do three things: produce, invest in capital accumulation, and invest in the development of new production technologies. To …x terminology, we shall refer to the second activity as "investment" and to the third as "R&D".
Technologies
We begin with a discussion of the technologies available to the typical …rm. To keep the notation simple, we suppress time arguments whenever confusion does not arise.
Production The …rm hires labor L i and combines it with its own capital K i according to
The …rm chooses the factor-intensity out of a set of known technologies:
The upper boundary i is the …rm's technology frontier and grows as a result of the …rm's R&D.
Total factor productivity (TFP) A is constant and common to all …rms. Allowing changes in A would add another state variable to the model and complicate the analysis immensely. By assuming constant A we do not mean to imply that factor-augmenting technical progress is unimportant or that the kind of technical change we study here should replace it. On the contrary, a complete model should include both. However, it is useful to focus the paper on what is new. We plan to develop the complete model in our future research.
The Cobb-Douglas technologies impose in the simplest possible way essentiality of both capital and labor for a i 2 (0; 1). However, a i = 0 yields X i = AL i , so that capital is non-essential, whereas a i = 1 yields X i = AK i , so that labor is non-essential and perpetual growth is feasible.
We use the term "capital" to capture all types of reproducible factors of production. Thus we make no distinction between physical and human capital. It would be desirable to extend the theory to distinguish between at least these two broad types of reproducible factors, but doing so is beyond the scope of the paper.
Finally, a i is not the "capital share."Our monopolistic intermediate …rms earn excess pro…t, so payments to K i and L i do not exhaust their revenues. The correct term for a i is the "elasticity of output with respect to capital", which is cumbersome, or "capital intensity", which is what we use hereafter.
Capital Investment The …rm's capital stock evolves according to
where I i is gross capital investment in units of the …nal good and is the depreciation rate.
Research & Development The …rm's highest known capital intensity i evolves according to
where R i is R&D investment in units of the …nal good. As long as i is less than its upper bound, it grows whenever the …rm devotes resources to R&D. Once i reaches its upper bound, it stays there irrespective of how much is spent on R&D. The productivity of R&D is a function f ( i ). For the time being we don't need to specify its properties. We discuss them in detail below, where they play a key role in the characterization of the economy's equilibrium dynamics.
The Firm' s Decisions
The …rm chooses paths of capital intensity, the price of its product, employment, investment and R&D to maximize the present value of its dividend payments:
where r t 1 t R t 0 r u du is the average interest rate between time 0 and time t, r u is the instantaneous interest rate at time u, and the optimization is subject to (2), (4), (5), (6) and the restrictions I it 0 and R it 0. The individual intermediate …rm perceives no upper bound on its choices of I or R. In the aggregate, of course, …rms'choices must satisfy the constraint
It is convenient to think of the …rm as operating two divisions, production and investment, and write the …rm's objective function to re ‡ect that internal structure: max fait;Pit;Lit;Iit;Ritg 1 t=0
The term inside the …rst set of parentheses is the instantaneous pro…t of the production division; the term inside the second set is the instantaneous pro…t of the investment division. The production division rents capital from the investment division, paying an internal transfer price p Ki . The investment division receives that rental income and spends resources on investment and R&D. We then exploit time-separability and solve the …rm's maximization problem in two steps. First, the production division chooses the optimal values of P i , L i , and K i taking w, p Ki and i as given. Then the investment division chooses I i and R i .
There is no explicit payment for technology, whose return is included in the rental income accruing to the investment division, p Ki K i . To see this, note that
The …rst term in the last expression is the explicit payment to capital. We assume the investment division does not exploit monopoly power in supplying capital to the production division because doing so would create ine¢ cient distortions within the …rm. Consequently, @p Ki =@K i = 0. The second term in the last expression is the implicit payment to technology. The intuition is that a more capital intensive technology allows the production division to use its capital and labor more e¢ ciently and thus produce more, inducing the production division to pay more for capital. The increased payment for capital compensates the investment division for the R&D that enabled the increase in capital e¢ ciency.
Choice of a, P , L and K Henceforth, we omit the i subscript except where clarity requires it. The production division solves
By splitting the …rm into production and investment divisions, we have separated the …rm's intratemporal and intertemporal decisions. Also, because price and quantity setting are equivalent decisions for a monopolist, we can use the demand curve (2) to eliminate P and think of the production division as facing a sequence of independent instantaneous pro…t maximization problems of the form
This setup posits a technology choice problem. Given that the …rm knows technologies in the interval a 2 [0; ], which does it use? All of them? Only that with the highest a? The following proposition due to provides the answer.
Proposition 1 (Zuleta 2008, Proposition 1) A …rm that has available Cobb-Douglas technologies with constant returns to scale and capital intensities in the range a 2 [ min ; max ] uses only one of the following three possible technologies: (1) only that with the lowest capital intensity, (2) only that with the highest capital intensity, or (3) only the two with the lowest and highest capital intensity.
We give some intuition for this result here and some more after we have presented the …rm's …rst-order conditions. 8 Let k be the …rm's capital/labor ratio, and consider two values of a, a 1 < a 2 . If k < 1, then k a1 > k a2 and the …rm chooses the lowest a at its disposal. The opposite holds if k > 1. Thus the …rm considers only the extreme technologies min and max . It might seem that the …rm would use only one of those two extreme technologies, but that is not true as long as the …rm can operate more than one plant at any given time. In that case, the …rm operates both extreme technologies and divides its labor force between them to equalize the marginal product of labor across the two plants. Suppose that the …rm allocates all capital to the most advanced plant (which we show momentarily to be optimal). As the …rm adds labor to that plant, labor's marginal product starts to fall. If there is enough labor, it falls to equality with its value in the primitive technology. Because the marginal product of labor is constant in the primitive plant but diminishing in the advanced plant, the …rm allocates all remaining labor to the primitive plant. In certain constrained cases that we discuss below the …rm operates only one of the two extreme technologies.
We set min = 0, thus positing that the …rm starts with a technology that uses only labor. As time passes, the …rm develops, at a cost, increasingly capital intensive technologies, so that max = > 0. The …rm's production division divides its labor force between a plant that uses the "primitive"technology a = 0 and one that uses the most "advanced" technology a = , continuously revising that allocation as new technologies become available.
The …rm's total output is the sum of the output from its two plants:
where L is the …rm's total employment, l 2 [0; L] is labor allocated to the advanced plant and L l is labor allocated to the primitive plant. This expression removes essentiality of capital for all < 1, not just for = 0. An economy that knows only the most primitive technology (i.e., an economy with = 0) builds no capital and produces with labor only. A more advanced economy with > 0 and some capital K can still use the primitive technology and produce output even if the capital disappears. Thus, thinking of capital intensity as a choice -as opposed to an exogenous parameter -changes radically the properties of an otherwise very conventional economy and, as we see later, provides an interesting ingredient to our development story.
The production division's problem now is
The …rst-order conditions are:
The …rst condition gives the …rm's demand for capital, the second gives the …rm's demand for labor, and the third gives the e¢ cient allocation of labor across the two plants. Because Y , X, and (1 1=") are positive, equation (10) implies
The right-hand side of (11) may exceed the …rm's total employment L. The …rm then is e¤ectively constrained and allocates all its labor to the advanced plant. To account for l L we write (10) in two parts, one part for the unconstrained case and one for the constrained case:
Similarly, we write (8) and (9):
The …rst line of (13) contains K=l, whose denominator is not the …rm's total labor employment L (and thus in general equilibrium is not the economy's labor endowment) because the …rm splits total labor across the two plants. The …rst line of (14) says that the value marginal product of labor in the primitive plant determines the wage in the unconstrained case because the …rm equalizes the marginal products of labor across the two plants To see the advantage of keeping the primitive plant operational in the unconstrained case, de…ne k K=l and rewrite the unconstrained part of (12) as
which says that the …rm splits labor across the two plants so that the capital/labor ratio in the advanced plant is (a) independent of factor prices, (b) always larger than 1, (c) increasing in capital intensity. Property (a) implies that the capital/labor ratio k is di¤erent from and independent of the economy's endowment ratio K=L. Property (b) implies that the plant's output is increasing in , which provides the rationale both for using only the a = technology out of the set (0; ] and for pursuing -increasing innovations. Property (c) implies that the development of more capital intensive technologies drives up the optimal capital/labor ratio and thus the incentive to accumulate capital. Together, (b) and (c) say that there is a positive feedback between capital accumulation and the pursuit of higher capital intensity.
The intuition for the positive feedback is that by developing more capital intensive technologies the …rm uses capital and labor more e¢ ciently. Speci…cally, the de…nition of k allows us to rewrite (7) as
It is then straightforward to show that
The left side of this equation is the same as the right side of (15) , which in turn is a rewriting of the unconstrained part of the …rst-order condition (12) . Thus the …rm's unconstrained optimal allocation of its total labor L between the primitive and advanced plant is that which maximizes the marginal product of capital in the advanced plant. Any remaining labor is employed in the primitive technology. This maximizing value of k depends on alone and so does not diminish with K. The reason is that the primitive plant provides the …rm with a "labor pool"that allows it to keep the marginal product of capital at its maximum value, determined solely by technology, as it uses more capital.
It is useful for later discussion to de…ne the maximized value of (k 1) =k as
The function m ( ) has the following properties: m 0 > 0 and m 00 > 0 for all 2 [0; 1], m (0) = 0, m (1) = 1, and m 0 (1) = 1 (see the Appendix for details). We call Am ( ) the "maximized discretionary marginal product," i.e., the part of the maximized marginal product that the …rm controls.
Choice of I and R The investment division, taking the production division's decisions as given, chooses I and R to maximize its present value:
The current-value Hamiltonian is
where and are the costate variables corresponding to K and , respectively, and ! I and ! R are Lagrange multipliers satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
The Hamiltonian is linear in the control variables I and R, so we have a bang-bang control problem. One of I and R is zero and the other is as high as possible, except in the knife-edge case when I and R yield equal returns. Moreover, whenever I > 0 we have ! I = 0 and thus = 1. Similarly, whenever R > 0 we have ! R = 0 and = 1=f ( ). These facts reduce the dimension of the state space from four to two because instead of having to solve for the paths of K, , and , we need to solve only for the paths of K and . We present the full set of necessary conditions in the Appendix. Here it is su¢ cient to state that they yield the following expressions for the returns to investment (net of depreciation) and R&D:
Symmetric equilibrium The returns to K and show that the investment division faces very strong increasing returns due to the production division's ability to allocate resources between two plants/technologies. Symmetric equilibrium requires that the …rm's return to innovation is decreasing in . That in turn requires that the term m 0 ( ) f ( ) in (19) is decreasing in for all 2 [0; 1], which, because m 00 ( ) > 0, can hold only if the function f ( ) is decreasing in . Recall that f ( ) is the productivity of R in the R&D technology (6) . We thus need to justify f 0 ( ) < 0.
We suppose the …rm's R&D activity accumulates knowledge Z and knowledge translates into values of with diminishing returns. For our purposes, it is su¢ cient to assume a simple linear relation:
We denote the relation between knowledge and technology by = h (Z) :
we obtain the reduced form (6) . Clearly, to have _ > 0 we need the marginal product of knowledge positive
is the value of Z, possibly in…nite, at which …rst equals 1. For now, it does not matter whether Z 1 is …nite or in…nite. We discuss that issue later. Symmetric equilibrium requires that the slope of f , given by
: be negative, which requires that h 00 ( ) < 0 for all < 1, so we impose that condition. Symmetric equilibrium requires even more. For the equilibrium to be stable, a …rm's incentive to pursue further innovations must decrease in . 9 That requires that m 0 ( ) f ( ) is decreasing in , which in turn requires that the concavity of h (Z) is su¢ ciently strong to o¤set the convexity of m ( ). 10 We therefore assume that
Symmetric equilibrium requires no further restrictions on the function h (Z), so we postpone a detailed discussion of the mapping f ( ) = h 0 h 1 ( ) until we have analyzed the economy's general equilibrium, where speci…c assumptions on h (Z) imply properties of f ( ) that determine speci…c characteristics of the economy's equilibrium path.
Taking Stock: The "hybrid" AK model
Before we discuss the model's general equilibrium solution, it is useful to assess what we have so far. The main innovations of our analysis are that: a. all prices and quantities are determined in market equilibrium; 9 See Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 1999 for a thorough discussion of the assumptions that support symmetric equilibria in growth models based on cost-reducing innovation.
1 0 A similar assumption of "su¢ cient concavity" is routine in quality-ladder models, where the cost of innovation is posited increasing and convex in quality in order to o¤set the fact that the pro…t from monopolizing the market is increasing and convex in quality; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for an example. In most applications the o¤set is exact in order to work with a return to innovation that is independent of quality.
b. the …rm chooses its capital intensity a out of a set of known technologies [0; ];
c. the …rm invests in R&D to expand the technology frontier .
The …rst innovation distinguishes our analysis from that of Seater (2005) and , who consider only the central planning solution. The second innovation changes radically the production structure of the economy and gives rise to what we refer to as the "hybrid AK" model. The third innovation has important implications for long-run growth. In this section we focus on the main features of the hybrid AK model. We discuss its dynamic implications in the next section.
The e¢ ciency condition (12) has the striking implication that there exists a region of ( ; K) space where output is linear in labor and capital separately. To see this, we use (12) to rewrite (7) as
The top line of this production structure has two characteristics that are important for the economy's dynamics. First, for given , capital has constant rather than diminishing returns. Given K, the …rm uses the labor-intensive technology to absorb any excess labor beyond that necessary to yield the outputmaximizing capital/labor ratio in the capital-intensive plant. As a result, the …rm is always willing to invest in the marginal unit of K. Second, the presence of the labor-intensive plant allows the …rm to keep the capital/labor ratio in the capital-intensive plant above one, that is, k > 1. An increase in then increases output, and the …rm always is willing to invest in the marginal unit of . This reciprocal reinforcing mechanism tends to generate perpetual growth.
We can describe the …rm's actions as "localized elimination"and "separation"of the factors of production. The …rm invests in R&D to learn to produce without labor ( = 1). It thus gradually eliminates labor from the advanced plant and so creates endogenously the engine of perpetual growth -a technology that in the limit use reproducible inputs only. This elimination of non-reproducible inputs is "local" in that it a¤ects only the advanced plant, not the overall production function of the …rm. Labor is a productive resource that the …rm knows how to use, with or without capital. Leaving idle the labor rendered "surplus" by technical progress would be suboptimal, so the …rm "separates" the labor not needed in the advanced plant from capital by employing it in the primitive technology. In so doing, the …rm removes diminishing returns from its total technology.
Note that we talk about a "…rm"allocating labor to two di¤erent "plants"because we found useful to set up the problem with only one decision maker. It should be obvious that we can decentralize decisions and talk about an "economy" that allocates labor to two di¤erent "sectors" linked by the arbitrage condition that wages be equalized. In that case, the reallocation of labor from the primitive to the advanced sector and vice versa is done by the market. The thrust of the story does not change: the economy endogenously creates perpetual growth through R&D that brings into existence a technology that eventually uses only capital. As labor demand falls in the capital-using sector, labor is absorbed by the primitive sector.
General Equilibrium
Given the assumption that capital and technology accumulate internally to the …rm, our economy has three markets: …nal good, intermediate goods, and labor. The …nal good is the numeraire and, because of our assumption of a constant saving rate, the market-clearing condition is
The market for intermediate goods is a continuum of monopolistic markets wherein equilibrium follows from each producer setting his price and thereby choosing a point on the demand curve he faces. Recall that …nal producers spend all their revenue on intermediate goods so that P X = P Y = 1. In symmetric equilibrium, then, each intermediate producer sets P = 1, and (1) yields Y = X.
The labor market is competitive, and households provide labor services inelastically. Equilibrium aggregate employment therefore is the economy's labor endowment L, and the wage rate is the value marginal product of that quantity of labor: w = 8 > < > :
To determine how …rms split the total ‡ow of savings across investment and R&D, we use the equilibrium wage in (22) to write the returns to K and in (18) and (19) as:
Because we have bang-bang control, there are three possible con…gurations for the pair (R; I):
In the …rst and third cases, the larger rate of return equals the value that makes the positive type of investment (either R or I) equal the given amount of saving. In the second case, the two rates of return are equal and at a level that makes the sum of the two types of investment equal saving. 11
The phase diagram
To analyze dynamics we construct two loci. The …rst is the arbitrage locus, along which agents are indi¤erent between allocating resources to investment or R&D, that is, where r = r K . The second is the stationarity locus, along which total net investment _ K + _ Z = _ K + _ =f ( ) is zero and the "total capital stock"K + Z is constant.
To construct the arbitrage locus we substitute the expressions for r and r K in (24) and (23) into the no-arbitrage condition r = r K . After some algebraic manipulations we obtain the following result.
. Then the arbitrage locus in ( ; K) space is
: 1 1 We also have used an interest rate r in the formal de…nition of the …rm's problem, but r plays no role in the solution (because the saving ratio is …xed) and is determined after the fact by the paths of r K and r , just as in the Solow model.
The locus is increasing in the interval ( ; 1). If lim !1 m 0 ( ) f ( ) = 0, the locus converges asymptotically to the vertical line = 1. If lim !1 m 0 ( ) f ( ) > 0, the locus crosses the vertical line = 1 at the positive, …nite valueK
The locus lies in the region
where the interior equilibrium l < L holds.
Proof. See the Appendix. 12 To construct the stationarity locus we use (5), (6) , (20) and the de…nition of Z to write the equilibrium condition of the …nal goods market (21) as
Upon imposing _ Z + _ K = _ =f ( ) + _ K = 0 and rearranging terms, we obtain the following result. The locus has two branches. One branch lies in the positive quadrant, starts at L sA , is increasing, and approaches the asymptote =~ , where~ satis…es m(~ ) = =sA. The other branch lies to the right of =~ in the negative quadrant.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In deriving these loci, we considered separately the cases where the constraint l L does or does not bind. The main results are the same in the two cases, so here we restrict attention to the unconstrained case, which is easier to discuss. See the Appendix for the constrained case.
The economy's dynamics depend crucially on whether the two loci intersect, which depends on whether sA= > 1 or sA= < 1, which we call the high and low saving cases, respectively. Figures 1 and 2 show the phase diagrams for the two cases. In both …gures, points below the arbitrage locus yield r < r K , so that R = _ =f ( ) = 0 (which implies that _ = 0 because _ T 0 as _ =f ( ) T 0) and I = _ K K > 0, whereas all points above the locus yield r > r K , so that R > 0 and I = 0. Points on the locus yield r = r K so that any combination of R and I for which _ =f ( ) + _ K = 0 is possible. In summary, points below, above, or on the stationarity locus yield _ =f ( ) + _ K > 0, _ =f ( ) + _ K < 0, and _ =f ( ) + _ K = 0, respectively. We now discuss the dynamics in each case. Figure 1 shows the phase diagram when sA= > 1. The dotted line is the labor constraint boundary. The pair of hyperbolic curves in the upper left and lower right corners together are the stationarity locus. The remaining curve is the arbitrage locus for the case where = 1 is reached in …nite time. In the case where = 1 is reached only asymptotically, the arbitrage locus would be asymptotic to the vertical line = 1. In either case, the arbitrage locus lies everywhere below the positive branch of the stationarity locus (see the Appendix). The arbitrage locus and the stationarity locus divide the phase plane into three regions, labelled I, II, and III. In region I, total accumulation is positive, _ =f ( ) + _ K > 0, and the rate of return to R&D is less than the rate of return to capital, r < r K . The latter fact implies, by the bang-bang nature of the problem, that gross capital investment I is positive and R&D is zero. Because R&D is zero, technology stays constant. Total accumulation is positive, however, so gross investment I exceeds depreciation K, and the capital stock K grows. The resulting equilibrium paths are vertical lines pointing north. In region II, we still have _ =f ( ) + _ K > 0, but r > r K so that R&D is positive and gross capital investment is zero. Hence, grows, and K falls because of depreciation. The resulting paths point southeast. Region III is like region II except that total accumulation is negative, _ K + _ =f ( ) < 0, meaning that although _ =f ( ) is positive, it is smaller than depreciation. As in region II, the paths point southeast.
Equilibrium Dynamics: High Saving
Consider the case where the economy reaches = 1 in …nite time. From that time forward the aggregate production function is Y = X = A (L + K), a function that is never exactly AK, because the primitive sector always operates, but that becomes AK as the primitive sector becomes a negligible part of the aggregate economy. The growth rate is:
The associated path is di¢ cult to analyze while < 1 but once = 1 it simpli…es to
The resource constraint (26) also simpli…es to
Combining these two equations yields
Thus, after the economy reaches = 1 the growth rate converges downward to the AK limit.
If the economy does not reach = 1 in …nite time, the advanced sector becomes AK only as t ! 1 and thus is never exactly AK. Qualitatively, however, the economy's dynamics are identical to the previous case: the aggregate technology A [L + m ( ) K] becomes AK in the limit as K goes to in…nity and goes to 1.
The intuition behind these results is that the production function (7) allows the typical …rm to allocate "surplus" labor to a separate plant and thereby neutralize diminishing returns to capital. As a result, …rms face incentives to accumulate capital and to develop more capital-intensive technologies that reinforce each other. As the advanced technology becomes AK, either in …nite time or asymptotically, labor is still an input in the overall production structure but the economy creates a technology (equivalently, a production sector) that uses reproducible inputs only and thus satis…es the condition for endogenous growth discussed in Rebelo (1991) .
A similar logic drives the economy's behavior at the origin. In its most primitive state = K = 0, but the economy nonetheless has output because capital is not essential. The economy therefore can produce capital according to the accumulation technology (5) and …gure out how to use it according to the research technology (6) . Interestingly, the economy starts by building up knowledge …rst, and only when it has developed technologies with su¢ cient capital intensity (once reaches ) does it start building capital. The reason is that with low values of both K and the advanced sector does not generate enough output to overcome depreciation, making construction of the capital unpro…table. The results are exactly the same if the arbitrage locus is asymptotic to = 1. In either case, the arbitrage locus intersects the stationarity locus at some 2 (0; 1). The intersection of the two loci creates the new region IV in which total accumulation _ K + _ =f ( ) < 0 and r < r K , implying that R&D is zero and net capital investment is negative. The equilibrium paths point south. The dynamics in regions I-III are as before. The portion of the stationarity locus below the arbitrage locus, shown as the heavy dashed arc between point x and the vertical line = 1, is a set of "Solow" steady states in which the economy has no growth because there is no exogenous growth in population or technology. Even the point where the stationarity locus hits = 1 and production in the advanced plant becomes AK is a no-growth steady state. From any starting point, the economy converges to levels of K and at which the amount of saving is exactly enough to maintain K.
Equilibrium Dynamics: Low Saving

If the arbitrage locus intersects the vertical line
= 1 at or below the point where the stationarity locus interesects that line, the heavy arc in Figure 2 collapses to the single point where the arbitrage locus intersects = 1, and that point is the unique steady state of the economy. This outcome is quite interesting and highlights the di¤erence between our model and the standard AK story. As the economy reaches = 1 and creates the sector that potentially supports endogenous growth, a well-de…ned equilibrum exists even when the saving rate is too low. Speci…cally, the economy obeys _ K + K = sA (L + K) and converges to K = L sA sA > 0:
The property that allows this outcome is that while the marginal product of capital is constant, the average product of capital is a decreasing function of K. In the standard AK story, in contrast, the marginal and average product of capital coincide and sA= < 1 yields perpetual shrinking of the capital stock.
Condition for Perpetual Growth
A comparision of the high and low saving cases suggests the following necessary and su¢ cient condition for perpetual growth.
Proposition 4
The economy exhibits perpetual growth if and only if s =A.
Achieving = 1 in Finite Time
In the foregoing discussion, the economy may approach = 1 asymptotically or reach it in …nite time. The determining condition is whether the limit of m 0 ( ) f ( ) is zero or positive. If lim !1 m 0 ( ) f ( ) = 0, the arbitrage locus approaches the vertical line = 1 asymptotically. Otherwise the arbitrage locus intersects the vertical line = 1, and the economy reaches = 1 in …nite time. Here we explore the conditions on the knowledge transformation function h (Z) that decide which case holds.
It is perhaps natural to start by imposing h (0) = 0 and to assume that …rms need in…nite knowledge to reach = 1. The latter assumption implies lim Z!1 h (Z) = 1 and lim Z!1 h 0 (Z) = 0. These properties, together with the properties of h (Z) discussed above, guarantee that f (0) > 0, f 0 ( ) < 0 for < 1, and lim !1 f ( ) = 0. What determines whether the economy attains = 1 in …nite time is how fast f ( ) goes to zero as ! 1.
Recall that m 0 ( ) = ln (1 ) = 2 m ( ) (see the Appendix), so
Recall also that m (1) = 1 and lim !1 [ ln (1 )] = 1 (see the Appendix). Thus, if the function f ( ) converges to zero faster than 
These yield, respectively:
In both cases lim !1 m 0 ( ) f ( ) = 0.
These two examples correspond to the …rst case in Proposition 2 where the economy approaches = 1 asymptotically because the transformation curve h (Z) becomes ‡at as Z approaches in…nity, a consequence of the fact that attaining = 1 requires in…nite knowledge. The corresponding function f ( ) captures this property by making the cost of attaining = 1 become in…nite su¢ ciently fast. Speci…cally, it does so by driving the productivity of R&D down to zero linearly or faster than linearly. It is possible, however, to obtain the same outcome with a knowledge transformation curve h (Z) that reaches 1 at a …nite value of Z. For example, let
Then, h 0 h 1 ( ) = 2 (1 )
which still goes to zero faster than m 0 ( ) goes to in…nity as ! 1 even though it is not necessary to accumulate in…nite knowledge to achieve = 1.
The fact that imposing Z 1 h 1 (1) = 1 is unneccessarily restrictive explains why and how we can construct examples that correspond to the second case in Proposition 2. In all the examples above f ( ) decreases fast enough that the rate of return to R&D, given by (24) , goes to zero as ! 1. That is not a necessary property of the theory, however. Stability of symmetric equilibrium requires only that r is decreasing in , not that it goes to zero. Therefore, the condition for stability of symmetric equilibrium can be satis…ed even if r converges to a positive lower bound. To construct an example, it is easiest to work directly with the inverse function h 1 . Let
where again we set Z 1 1. Di¤erentiating, we have
Accordingly,
and
The rate of return r starts at in…nity and decreases monotonically to 1 1 AK.
This last example makes clear that the relevant property of the curve h (Z) that allows us to work with a symmetric equilibrium is whether f ( ) ! 0 faster than m 0 ( ) ! 1 as ! 1, not whether = 1 requires in…nite knowledge or whether the rate of return to R&D goes to zero. 13 There are functional forms for h (Z) that do not satisfy this necessary condition. Two examples are
These two functions allow the economy to reach = 1 in …nite time, but they have strictly positive …rst derivatives at = 1, which prevents f ( ) from o¤setting m 0 ( ) and thus r from being monotonically decreasing in . As a result, these functions cannot support a stable symmetric equilibrium. However, if one is willing to relax the requirement that the equilibrium be symmetric (for example, in a model where all R&D is done by a single monopolist) transformation curves such as these are admissible. 14 We conclude that convergence to = 1 in …nite time does not require extreme or implausible assumptions and therefore is a sensible case in the framework of our theory. Literally, AK production means that no human intervention is needed. Science …ction bu¤s will recognize this as the Krell technology from the movie Forbidden Planet. Apparently it is feasible in economic theory (and to the extent that the theory …ts the facts in reality), as well as in …ction.
Some Important Implications
Our theory has several interesting implications.
Endogenous Technical Change and The Linearity Critique
The most important implication of our theory is that factor-eliminating technical change can generate perpetual growth without imposing the assumptions that have been subject to the "linearity critique." The …rst expression of the critique was Solow's (1994) remark that early versions of endogenous growth models required constant returns to reproducible factors:
"The conclusion has to be that [the constant returns] version of the endogenous-growth model is very un-robust. It cannot survive without exactly constant returns to capital. But you would have to believe in the tooth fairy to expect that kind of luck."
Solow went on to remark that newer versions of endogenous growth theory might avoid this implausible assumption, but subsequent analysis by Jones (2005) and Growiec (2007) shows that to be false. Jones remarks that all existing growth models have some form of a linearity assumption in the system of di¤erential equations governing growth, and Growiec provides a formal proof that such an assumption is in fact necessary.
Growiec's argument is easily summarized. Consider an economy with a vector of dependent variables Z. Denote the growth rate of Z byẐ, and let it be governed by the equation
For the economy to have a balanced growth path, it must be that
which requires either that _ Z = 0 or that DF is singular. The …rst case means that Z does not grow, so the necessary condition for perpetual growth is singularity of DF . As Growiec notes, such a condition is imposed either explicitly or implicitly in all growth models developed to date, whether exogenous, semi-endogenous, or endogenous. In this light the linearity assumptions discussed by Jones (2005) are just examples of how researchers satisfy the necessary singularity condition in speci…c applications. Jones and Growiec both argue that there is no compelling reason for any version of the necessary singularity assumption. In each growth model, the necessary restriction is imposed simply because it is needed to produce steady-state growth, not because it has a cogent underlying economic rationale. Re ‡ecting on this state of a¤airs, Growiec speculates that perpetual economic growth seems a fragile proposition.
In this regard, our model stands in sharp contrast to all previous theories of economic growth because it imposes no singularity a priori but delivers perpetual growth anyway. The reason is that the necessary singularity emerges endogenously from the process of factor-eliminating technical progress, at least asymptotically. If the saving rate is su¢ ciently high, the economy becomes asymptotically AK and enjoys perpetual growth bounded away from zero. Factor-eliminating technical change allows an economy to transform its production function from one that cannot sustain perpetual growth into one that can. Whether an economy that starts with diminishing returns, or even no returns at all, to capital takes advantage of this possibility depends on human choice -most notably the saving rate -not on supernatural intervention. 15 1 5 The linearity/singularity arguments do not distinguish between legitimate questions concerning the foundations of the theory and questions concerning the theory's …t to the data. There is a sense in which the linearity critique is either incomplete or poorly formulated. Researchers introduce the singularity -typically by positing some kind of exponential augmentation process -to …t the steady state of the models to the long-run data of economies such as the US and the UK that for more than a century and a half have displayed (nearly) constant exponential growth of income per capita. In so doing, they follow Solow, who introduced exogenous labor-augmenting technological change for that very reason. The di¤erence rests only on whether one wants the exponential rate of growth to be endogenous or is content with leaving it exogenous. If the linearity critique is understood as the assertion that models that …t the most basic growth fact rest on stronger foundations if they also provide a mechanism that delivers the singularity needed to …t the data as the outcome of economic forces, then we wholeheartedly agree and submit that in this paper we have developed a model that does exactly that.
Maintained Hypotheses for Econometric Testing
A related issue concerns the hypotheses to maintain in econometric tests of endogenous growth theory. It is standard when using Cobb-Douglas production functions to assume that the exponents are constant. If there is factor-eliminating technical change, that assumption is false, and any resulting estimates or their interpretation may be invalid. Consider what an observer with the conventional assumption of constant factor intensities would see. At any point on the equilibrium path, a snapshot of the economy would suggest an inability to sustain endogenous growth. The economy would have a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant TFP, a value of between 0 and 1, and diminishing returns to reproducible factor. Even if the economy is guaranteed to attain asymptotically the AK structure, an observer who imposes the standard hypothesis of constant factor intensities would estimate a production technology that cannot sustain endogenous growth. The observer's view would be incorrect, however, because the maintained joint hypothesis is incorrect: capital's intensity is not a constant but is instead an endogenous variable. In particular, the economy places increasing emphasis on the reproducible factor K and endogenous growth is possible.
Behavior at the Origin
In our model the origin is not a steady state: an economy starting exactly at the origin moves away from it. What allows this outcome is that output at the origin is positive, rather than zero, because production of intermediate goods is linear in labor. Consequently, saving is positive and investment occurs. Investing in capital alone would be pointless if stays at zero, while inventing technologies with positive would be equally pointless if capital does not accumulate. Interestingly, because of depreciation it is optimal to invest only in early on and start building up the capital stock only when capital intensity is su¢ ciently high. This kind of behavior at the origin seems realistic, at least if one accepts the notion that humans arose from other animals that did not build capital or do R&D. In other words, humans started with nothing except their labor and, through their own e¤orts, moved away from that state. The image we have in mind is the insightful ape in the …rst act of the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey, who has no capital but discovers the use of tools. The di¤erence between the movie and our theory is that in our theory, instead of getting his inspiration exogenously from the Monolith, the ape …gures out how to use tools with his own wits.
This property has interesting implications for the theory of economic development because the transition from the most primitive technology to industrialization does not require exogenous forces to get started. Most existing models of economic transition (e.g., Goodfriend and McDermott 1995, Hansen and Prescott 2002, Lucas 2002) jump-start the process by endowing the economy with two production technologies, one primitive and one advanced. They then characterize the reallocation of resources from one to the other. Galor and Weil (2000) avoid the exogenous endowment of primitive and advanced technologies, constructing a model with only one technology augmented by endogenous technical progress and human capital. However, their model requires an initial period of costless technological advance to kick the economy out of its primitive state. These models o¤er many useful insights, but they leave unanswered the question of where the advanced technology, or the initial advance in technology, comes from. In our model, instead, advanced technologies arise endogenously as the economy devotes resources to research and development. No exogenous progress ever occurs. No exogenous spark is required to light the …re of discovery.
The Role of Imperfect Competition
Monopolistic competition is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for positive R&D. The important relations are the two equilibrium loci given by equations (25) and (27) . The elasticity of substitution is the indicator of the …rm's price-setting power. Larger values of indicate less pricing power, with no price-setting power when = 1. The arbitrage locus is well de…ned for any admissible value of , including in…nity, and the stationarity locus is independent of . Consequently, everything we have derived is valid for the pricetaking case. The reason is that in our model the fruits of R&D remain completely internal to the …rm. Any technical advances by the …rm's investment division can be used by the …rm's production division, but outside …rms do not have access to the new technology. Technical advances therefore are excludable, which is su¢ cient for positive R&D even if is in…nite and the …rm has no monopoly pricing power. If the fruits of R&D are not fully excludable, then monopolistic competition provides an alternative motivation for R&D. When is …nite, intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes, all are used in symmetric equilibrium, and intermediate goods …rms have monopoly pricing power. In that case, even if spillovers occur and technical advances leak out of the …rms that …rst discover them, monopoly pro…t and the desire by …rms to reduce costs motivate R&D. So either excludability or a …nite value of is su¢ cient for R&D to occur.
Factor Bias
Our theory o¤ers new perspectives on two aspects of technical change that have been much discussed in the literature: factor-bias and induced progress. Factor-bias is the change in factors'relative rates of return caused by technical progress. Induced technical progress is that which arises in response to an increase in the quantity of one of the factors. 16 It is straightforward to see that factor-eliminating progress is biased toward capital and is induced by increases in capital. Intermediate output is given by equation (20) . When the labor constraint is not binding, the marginal products of K and L are Am (a) and A, respectively, and their ratio m ( ) is monotonically increasing in . When the labor constraint binds, the marginal products of K and L are AK 1 L 1 and (1 ) AK L , and their ratio (1 ) L=K again is monotonically increasing in . In both cases, then, technical progress is biased toward capital. Also, an increase in K always makes higher desirable. The marginal product of is Am 0 ( ) K when the labor constraint binds and is AK L 1 ln (K=L) when it does not bind. Both are increasing functions of K because m 0 ( ) > 0 for all and ln(K=L) > 0 whenever the labor constraint binds since the constraint boundary is K=L = (1 ) 1= > 1. Factor-eliminating progress satis…es what Acemoglu (2007) de…nes as strong relative equilibrium bias, which means that the increase in induced by an increase in K is su¢ ciently large to compensate the downward pressure on the marginal product of K due to diminishing returns to K. 17 
Evidence
Our theory has obvious implications for the dynamics of the income shares of non-reproducible factors. Our variable L represents all non-reproducible factors, and that variable's share of national income is
Because AL is constant and Y rises monotonically, the model predicts that the income shares of nonreproducible factors fall over time. Data on income shares of most non-reproducible factors is limited, but what data are available suggest that the model's prediction agrees with the facts. Consider three types of non-reproducible factors: unskilled labor, land, and energy.
(I) Unskilled labor. Bound and Johnson (1995) and Krueger (1999) present evidence that unskilled labor's income share of the US economy has been falling. Krueger reports that the share was down to 6 percent by the mid-1990s. At the same time, the income share of skilled labor has been rising (e.g., Blanchard, 1997 Blanchard, , 1998 . Recall that our variable K is broadly de…ned and includes human capital. An increase in therefore tends to increase skilled labor's income share.
(II) Land. The return on land is di¢ cult to measure because much of it comes as capital gains, not included in national income accounts. Nevertheless, estimates of land's share in aggregate income are available. Land's income share in England was about 25% in 1600 (Clark, 2001) , but by 2000 it had dropped to about 0.1% (Bar and Leukhina, 2006) . 18 We can get a di¤erent, indirect measure of land's income share by looking at agriculture data. Land is a major factor of agricultural production but is of negligible importance in manufacturing and service production. Indeed, land is always included in agricultural production functions but always omitted from an industrial economy's aggregate production function. As an economy shifts emphasis from agriculture to manufacturing and service, land's income share falls. Such a shift is evident in the data. In the US, for example, the National Income and Product Accounts show that agriculture accounted for 8.92% of Net National Product in 1929 but only 0.59% in 2005. Finally, Weil (2005, (III) Energy. Data from the Energy Information Administration (U.S. Department of Energy) and NIPA show that total real expenditures on energy in the US grew over the period 1990-2001 at a rate of about 1.5% per year, whereas real GDP grew at an annual rate of about 2.8%. These two …gures indicate an accumulated drop of about 15% in energy expenditures as a share of GDP even over a period marked by unusually large (and likely to be partly reversed) increases in energy prices. Data for longer periods are not readily available, but data for related variables suggest similar drops. For example, energy use relative to GDP in the U.S. fell from 19,566 BTU per real dollar of GDP in 1949 to 9,041 BTU per real dollar in 2005.
More rigorous evidence is available if we are willing to make a slight compromise. Our theory predicts that output always grows and that the capital intensity grows most of the time (everywhere except in region I in Figure 1 and regions I and IV in Figure 2 ). Thus the model predicts that output and capital intensity should be positively correlated on average. Our theory includes elements of imperfect competition, so the capital intensity is not the same as the factor share, but nonetheless the two are related. If we are willing to use factor shares as approximate measures of factor intensities, then we can test the model. We do not have su¢ ciently long time series data on factor shares to do a time series test. However, several authors recently have produced cross-country data on factor shares that we can use.
Probably the best known cross-country factor share data are those provided by Gollin (2002) . His data show a statistically insigni…cant relation between capital share on the one hand and output per person on the other (and in fact the point estimate is negative rather than positive). Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) extend Gollin's data set to a larger sample of countries, and they also correct it to measure income per worker rather than income per capita. Their data give an even stronger result because the relation between total capital's share and income per worker is still negative but now is statistically signi…cant as well. These results are bolstered by Rodriguez and Ortega's (2006) …nding of a statistically signi…cant negative correlation between capital shares and incomes per worker using UNIDO and OECD industrial survey data.
At …rst glance, then, the evidence seems to reject our theory, but …rst impressions are indeed deceiving. Our theory says nothing about the income shares of total capital or total labor but rather about the income shares of reproducible and non-reproducible inputs. The former include physical and human capital, and the latter include land, natural resources, and unskilled labor. The usual accounting scheme confounds returns to reproducible and non-reproducible elements in the measured income shares. In the usual accounting, returns to physical capital, land, and natural resources are lumped together as the "return to capital," and the returns to human capital and unskilled labor are lumped together as the "return to labor." Such amalgamated returns do not measure the returns relevant to our theory.
Fortunately, proper measures are available. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) use World Bank data to construct income shares for reproducible capital (physical capital) and natural capital (land and natural resources), precisely the distinction that our theory suggests. We regress their income share series on output per worker. The results support our theory. The income share for total capital is signi…cantly negatively related to output per worker, as previous investigators have found. The striking new …nding is that the income share for reproducible capital is signi…cantly positively related to output per worker, as our theory predicts. The two results together imply that the income share of natural capital is signi…cantly negatively related to output per worker, also as our theory predicts. Table 1 reports the regression results, and Figure 3 plots the two returns as well as their regression lines against output per worker. Caselli and Feyrer do not provide data on the income share of human capital, but Zuleta has kindly provided us with such data for the OECD countries. Those data show a slight and statisitically insigni…cant negative relation between the income share of total human factors and output per worker, but a strong and statistically signi…cant positive relation between the income share of just the human capital component of human income and income per worker, as our theory predicts. See Table 1 for the regression results and Figure 4 for the plots. The data, then, strongly support our theory.
Variable factor shares have important implications for explanations of cross-country di¤erences in output per worker. The standard approach is to assume that factor shares are the same across countries, estimate TFP from the data, and then decompose cross-country income di¤erences into the parts arising from di¤erences in TFP and from other observables, such as physical and human capital. The typical …nding is that about half the cross-country di¤erences arise from di¤erences in TFP and half from di¤erences in the other observables (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997) . Sturgill (2009) , however, …nds that allowing factor shares to di¤er across countries dramatically changes the accounting results. The fraction of cross-country income di¤erences attributable to cross-country variaion in TFP drops from 55% when factor shares are assumed constant to a much lower 23% when cross-country factor share variation is taken into account. Cross-country variation in factor shares, totally ignored in the standard approach, accounts for about 35% of the cross-country income di¤erences. As Sturgill notes, technical change still is the dominant factor in explaining cross-country income di¤erences, but more than half of that change comes in the form of factor elimination rather than factor augmentation.
Conclusion
We have proposed a theory of endogenous technical progress that alters factor intensity. The theory can deliver perpetual economic growth without any sort of factor augmenting technical change. In particular, the AK model is the asymptotic limit of the economy if the saving rate is su¢ ciently high. The theory avoids the singularity/linearity critique by making the singularity that is necessary for perpetual growth an endogenous outcome of the growth process itself. An economy that initially does not satisfy the necessary restriction changes its technology so that eventually it satis…es the restriction. The theory also implies that it is incorrect to interpret previous estimates of production functions as evidence for or against the possibility of endogenous growth because both the estimates and their interpretation maintain the incorrect hypothesis that some key parameters are constants rather than endogenous variables. In particular, for the Cobb-Douglas technology, the exponents should not be treated as constants. The theory o¤ers an explanation of economic transition that does not rely on exogenous technical change or on the existence of latent modern technologies that the economy activates when the right conditions arise. Human progress is entirely the result of human activity and human choices.
If we think of unskilled labor as a non-reproducible factor, our theory has important implications for income distribution dynamics. Assuming that the economy starts at or near the origin, unskilled labor's share drops along the equilibrium path. It never disappears, but it goes asymptotically to zero. This outcome is similar to what already has happened to land's share in industrialized economies. On the other hand, skilled labor's share rises because human capital, which is subsumed under our broadly de…ned "capital," earns a wage that increases faster than the growing national income.
Although our theory posits imperfect competition, so that factor intensities are not the same as factor shares, if one is willing to assume that factor shares estimated from national income accounts provide reasonable estimates of factor intensities, our theory's predictions are consistent with both the time series and cross-section evidence documenting that factor shares change over time, with the shares of reproducible factors rising and those of non-reproducible factors falling.
Time variation in factor intensities has an important implication for the measurement of Total Factor Productivity. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), for example, use a Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate TFP for a large set of countries. They …nd that cross-country di¤erences in TFP are of paramount importance in explaining cross-country di¤erences in economic performance. However, they make the usual assumption that countries have all the same capital intensity of about 1/3. Both our theory and the historical evidence suggest that factor intensities di¤er substantially across countries. In that case, it is not appropriate to summarize all di¤erences in technology by di¤erences in TFP. It would be useful to re-calculate estimates of TFP across countries, like those of Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire, allowing for cross-country variation in factor shares to get some idea of how much of the variation in cross-country economic performance depends on di¤erences in TFP and how much depends on di¤erences in factor intensities.
The theory suggests several lines of future research, both theoretical and empirical. An obvious extension is to include both factor-augmenting and factor-eliminating technical change because empirical evidence suggests that both occur. We have done an initial exploration along these lines, and the theory seems tractable and interesting. Another interesting extension is to make either saving or depreciation endogenous. Endogenous saving would be parallel to moving from the Solow model to the Cass model. It is non-trivial because of the increase in the dimensionality of the system. Presumably, introducing endogenous depreciation would face similar di¢ culties. Table 1 Factor Shares vs. Output per Worker The necessary conditions are: @H @ = I K;
@H @I = 1 + + ! I = 0;
t t e rtt = 0:
When I > 0, (32) yields = 1 and _ = 0. Substituting into (30) we obtain
When R > 0, (33) yields = 1=f ( ). Taking logs and time derivatives and substituting into (31) we obtain
Inserting (15) into (13) and di¤erentiating we obtain (18) and (19) in the text.
Labor-Constraint Boundary
The boundary between the regions where the labor constraint does and does not bind is
The boundary's slope is
Application of L'Hopital's Rule shows that K = eL for = 0 and K ! 1 as ! 1 and that dK=d = eL=2 for = 0. The term in brackets is positive for 2 (0; 1). Hence the locus is increasing and asymptotic to the vertical line = 1 as ! 1.
Arbitrage Locus and Proof of Proposition 2
We use (24) and (23) 
where z ( ) arg solve K
) :
Consider …rst the …rst part of (37). If = [A ( 1)] 1 the term in brackets is non-positive, the constraint K 0 binds, and the curve collapses to the -axis. If = [A ( 1)] < 1, then by the properties of m ( ) there is a value 2 (0; 1) such that m ( ) Q = [A ( 1)] as Q . We then have
which is increasing for 2 ( ; 1] because m 0 ( ) > 0 and d [m 0 ( ) f ( )] =d < 0. De…ne lim !1 m 0 ( ) f ( ) Then the curve cuts the vertical line = 1 at the valuê K = 1 1 A ( 1) :
Recalling that m (1) = 1, we see that, if = 0, thenK = 1 and the curve is asymptotic to the vertical line = 1. If > 0, thenK is …nite. Now consider the second part of (37). By construction, the curves described by the two parts of (37) intersect the boundary (36) at common points. There are three possibilities. First, the curve z ( ) lies everywhere below the boundary (36) and everywhere above the curve in the …rst part of (37) , as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5 , where au is the unconstrained arbitrage locus, ac is the constrained arbitrage locus, and b is the constraint boundary. (We have drawn Figure 5 for the case where the arbitrage locus does not intersect the vertical line = 1, but the same arguments apply to the case where the locus intersects = 1.) Second, the three curves are mutually tangent at a single point, as shown in the middle panel of Figure 5 . Third, the curves intersect. In this case, to the left of the …rst intersection point both curves lie below the boundary (36) and the second part of (37) is irrelevant. The same is true to the right of the second intersection point. Between those two intersection points, both curves lie above the boundary (36) and the …rst part of (37) is irrelevant. The arbitrage locus therefore is the heavy curve in Figure 5 given by the union of the relevant segments of the two parts of (37): …rst the segment of the …rst part below the boundary (36), then the segment of the second part above the boundary, and …nally another segment of the …rst part below the boundary.
The arbitrage locus consists of only the …rst part of (37) if the locus lies everywhere below the boundary (36) , as in the bottom panel of Figure 5 . That happens if 
Consider …rst the unconstrained case in the …rst part of (39), which we illustrate in Figure 6 . If sA= < 1 the term in brackets is positive and the curve starts at K = LsA= for = 0 and rises to K = LsA= ( sA) for = 1. If sA= 1, there is a value~ 2 (0; 1] such that m (~ ) = =sA, and the curve has two branches. The left branch holds for 0 <~ , starts at K = LsA= for = 0 and rises asymptotically to in…nity as !~ . The right branch holds for~ < 1 and is in the lower right quadrant of the Cartexian plane where it starts at L [( =sA) 1] 1 for = 1 and falls to minus in…nity as #~ . The lower panel of Figure  6 shows the curve, the upper panel shows possible con…gurations of the left branch, denoted su, relative to the boundary (36), denoted b.
For the constrained case in the second part of (39), illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 7 , we have K = LsA= for = 0, dK d = (1 ) 2 L sA Hence, the curve, denoted sc in the …gure, is increasing and asymptotic to the vertical line = 1 for sA= > 1, ‡at for sA= = 1, decreasing and converging to the -axis for sA= < 1.
Refer now to the upper panel of Figure 7 . By construction, sc and su intersect the boundary b at the common point^ = arg solve
The right side of the equation in curly brackets is an increasing function of with codomain [1; e]. Thus, if sA= 2 (1; e] the stationarity locus intersects the labor constraint boundary, if sA= > e both the …rst and second parts of (39) lie everywhere above the boundary (36) , and if sA= 1 both parts lie everywhere below the boundary. Note, however, that the slope of the …rst part of (39) is less than the slope of the second part at both = 0 and =^ , implying that the two curves have at least one other intersection in the interval (0;^ ).
For sA= 1, then, the stationarity locus is given by only the …rst part of (39) because the second part lies in the region where the constraint is not binding. For sA= > 1, the stationarity locus is the heavy curve consisting of the …rst part of (39) for <^ and the second part for >^ . Furthermore, becausê <~ the term sA sAm ( ) is strictly positive whenever it applies. Collecting these results gives us the following equation: Refer to Figure 7 . For sA= e, the curve su is everywhere above the curve sc, which in turn is everywhere above the boundary b. The assumption L 1 in Proposition 2 guarantees that the curve au is everywhere below the boundary b, so it follows that the stationarity locus is everywhere above the arbitrage locus. For 1 sa= < e, the curves su and sc intersect at^ and the stationarity locus is the union of the segment of su for <^ and the segment of sc for >^ . Now note that in the interval^ 1 the curve sc is everywhere above the boundary b, which is everywhere above the curve au. In the interval 0 ^ , instead, the curve su is below the boundary b and thus we need to check directly that it does not intersect the curve au. Rearranging terms, the condition for the curve au to be below the curve su is
The right-hand side is a curve that starts out at +1 for ! + and decreases monotonically to 1 for ! 1. Accordingly, sA= 1 ensures that this inequality holds, and au lies everywhere below su. Collecting these results, we conclude that the stationarity locus is everywhere above the arbitrage locus if sA= 1.
Transversality conditions: investment division
After the economy reaches the = 1 limit, the interest rate is constant and equal to the net marginal product of capital, r = 1 A . We assume 1 A > 0 to guarantee r > 0. Asymptotically, capital grows at rate sA . Also, = 1 for all t. We thus have lim t!1 t K t e rtt = lim t!1
K 0 e (sA )t e ( 1 A )t = 0:
This surely holds for sA . For sA > , it holds if 1= < 1 s and fails if 1= 1 s. We thus must impose an upper bound on the monopoly pro…t ratio 1= . Also, = 1 and = 1 yield 
